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Trends in Communist Media

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~~Confidential~~

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U. S. C A B I N E T C H A N G E S

FIRST COMMUNIST MEDIA REPORTS SPARSE, LACKING IN COMMENT

Initial communist media reaction to the high-level cabinet and other personnel changes announced by President Ford on 3 November has been sparse and scattered to date. The Soviet media thus far have confined themselves to selective reportorial treatment implying that the changes mean a continuation of the U.S. detente policy. East European media have been more forthcoming, with the East Germans in particular stating directly what Moscow has only implied--that the removal of Defense Secretary Schlesinger was a step based on an Administration desire to preserve the momentum for detente and disarmament negotiations. Peking media have not yet acknowledged the U.S. cabinet changes. Other communist media treatment has only begun to appear.

MOSCOW Moscow has reported briefly the high-level personnel shifts in the U.S. Administration announced by President Ford on 3 November, but it has not yet commented on these events. There can be little doubt, however, that Moscow will assess the shifts positively, interpreting them as an indication that the Ford Administration intends to continue to pursue good relations with the Soviet Union.

Moscow's initial report on the changes was a TASS English dispatch on 3 November citing U.S. press reports that the President was planning cabinet changes and that Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby were among those slated for replacement. Another TASS English report on the 3d announced Vice President Rockefeller's letter to the President asking not to be considered as a candidate for the 1976 elections. Moscow revealed the news to its domestic audience on the 4th, in a commentary by Aleksandr Druzhinin reporting selectively on U.S. media comment on the President's press conference.

While avoiding any single explanation for the U.S. leadership shifts, Druzhinin gave prominence to interpretations that identified Schlesinger as the key figure in the changes. The former defense secretary's reputed disagreement with Kissinger over SALT, as well as other unspecified disagreements over the defense budget and questions of intelligence collection, were identified as causes of his resignation. Druzhinin went on to imply by other citations and by his reporting of the President's positive statements on detente and SALT that the main issue precipitating the government shakeup was the issue of detente.

This interpretation fits the general picture of the Washington political scene that Moscow has been projecting in its comment for some time. The latest issue of USA journal, for example, carried an article by chief editor V.M. Berezhevskiy which interpreted Schlesinger's

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reported comments about the possible use by the United States of nuclear weapons to prevent a battlefield defeat as reflecting a "struggle about detente underway in U.S. ruling circles."

Schlesinger has been identified by Moscow as a spokesman of the conservative forces within the Administration, his published remarks on nuclear doctrine and the "Soviet threat" usually being cited as evidence. In addition, some Soviet writers have implied that the former secretary has held a deep-seated hostility toward the Soviet Union.

EAST EUROPE Initial comment by Moscow's East European allies and Yugoslavia on the high-level personnel changes announced by President Ford on 3 November cautiously approved the shifts as a success for the Ford-Kissinger detente policies and a defeat for ousted Secretary Schlesinger's tough defense policies and the so-called military-industrial complex. At the same time, East European commentators warned that the struggle between "realistic" and hardline philosophies in U.S. foreign policy was far from over and that the deeper implications of the changes would emerge only with the passage of time. Only passing attention has been given to the replacement of CIA Director Colby, the event being treated as a predictable outgrowth of the current Congressional investigations of the Agency. There was little initial comment on the designated new Defense and CIA chiefs, Rumsfeld and Bush. The meager comment devoted to Vice President Rockefeller's withdrawal as Mr. Ford's 1976 running mate routinely assessed the move as strengthening the President's support from conservatives in the coming election.

The East Berlin radio, which has carried the largest volume of comment so far, declared in a Washington-dated Kaeubler dispatch on the 3d that President Ford had to make a choice between "two diametrically opposed poles of foreign policy planning" and dismiss Schlesinger in order to avoid jeopardizing the signing of a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union. The commentary also viewed Schlesinger's replacement as reflecting President Ford's desire to keep intact "Nixon's system" of concentrating foreign policy direction in the White House.

A Prague television commentary on the 3d noted that in his appearance on U.S. television on the 2d, the "well-known hawk" and Presidential candidate, Senator Jackson, "was attempting to keep Schlesinger in a post which is very important for the military-political relationship." Curiously, and erroneously, the Prague radio claimed that President Ford at his news conference "had confirmed that the differences of opinion" between Kissinger and Schlesinger had caused the latter's removal.

There were mixed views about the implications of the shakeup for Secretary Kissinger. The Budapest radio on the 3d surmised that the

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President had taken "a swipe at Kissinger" by relieving him of his National Security Council post--a move that had "long been demanded by hardliners opposed to Kissinger's method of negotiations." And the Warsaw radio the same day speculated that alleged Congressional distrust of Secretary Kissinger might induce the President to remove him also in order to improve Mr. Ford's relations with Congress.

In the only substantial comment on the removal of CIA Director Colby, the Budapest radio on the 3d remarked that his departure would be welcomed by those who had considered him "too talkative" before the Congressional investigating committees. The commentary added that Colby had, however, never been brought to account for "his real sins"--administration of the Phoenix program, which had "resulted in the murder of 40,000 Vietnamese." Belgrade's TANJUG the same day attributed the CIA leadership change to the recent revelations about alleged domestic spying and plots to assassinate foreign leaders, and to intelligence "failures" in Vietnam, the Middle East, Cyprus and Portugal. The TANJUG commentary noted approvingly that the U.S. Government personnel changes were intended by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to convince the Soviet Union that they were "resolute and sincere" about continuing a policy of detente.

Romanian broadcast media so far have only reported the U.S. changes without comment.

CUBA Havana domestic service on 3 November promptly reported the shakeup in the U.S. executive branch, attributing the changes to "serious disagreements within the Administration" and, indirectly, to Congressional criticism of the intelligence community. The report noted that "although it praises their ominous international activities," the U.S. Congress disapproved of the intelligence agencies' spying in the United States. While Havana merely reported the "firing" of Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby, the broadcast emphasized Secretary Kissinger's removal from his post as national security adviser, noting that "from that position, Kissinger controlled all subversive activities" carried out by the CIA, NSA and armed forces.

VIETNAM Initial comment on the U.S. leadership changes in North and South Vietnamese communist media has for the most part comprised replays of Western news accounts. Focusing mainly on the change in Secretary of State Kissinger's role, the Vietnamese broadcasts have devoted comparatively little attention to the dismissals of Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby and to Vice President Rockefeller's decision not to run in 1976. While not directly attacking Kissinger, a 3 November Hanoi radio broadcast pointedly cited speculation that President Ford's moves were meant to curtail Kissinger's power. And, in an apparent attempt to discredit Kissinger's management of the National Security Council (NSC), the same

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Hanoi radio account incorrectly cited a NEWSWEEK magazine report of the 2d as declaring that the NSC had come under increasing criticism resulting from its mishandling of the situations in Vietnam, Cyprus, and the Middle East and from the recently revealed CIA activities. Later broadcasts--which have included NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentaries of the 5th--have dismissed the changes as political maneuverings which will have little effect on U.S. policies.

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U. S. - SOVIET TRADE

MOSCOW MENTION OF GRAIN PURCHASE CONFINED TO AMERICAN AUDIENCE

A 3 November Moscow broadcast in English to North America carries the only known Soviet mention to date of the longterm U.S.-Soviet agreement on purchases of U.S. grain which was signed on 20 October. Moscow media intended for the Soviet audience not only have ignored the agreement but have completely avoided any mention of the subject of grain imports. The broadcast reference came in a commentary on recent developments in Soviet-American trade by Yevgeniy Shershnev, deputy director of the USA Institute and a specialist in foreign trade. He argued that the recently signed agreement on "annual Soviet purchases of U.S. wheat and corn over a five-year period" would benefit both the United States and the USSR. He declared that it would guarantee American farmers a market, stabilize employment for transport workers, and help the United States with its economic problems by ensuring a billion dollars export income every year.

In acknowledging that the agreement "is also profitable to the Soviet Union," Shershnev alluded to crop failures only in the most general way, evading the admission that current Soviet crop failures were a key factor in prompting the agreement. Thus he said that the deal would not only help overcome the "adverse effects that unfavorable climatic conditions have on crops in certain years," but, more importantly, it would permit considerable savings through directly importing grain to the Soviet Far East rather than expensively shipping it by rail from European Russia. In this manner, Shershnev said, longterm import agreements with the United States "or other specific countries" provide broad prospects for "a mutually advantageous international division of labor."

While decrying the failure to implement the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement because the United States "has not fulfilled its commitments," Shershnev professed optimism concerning future Soviet-American economic ties and concluded that "in the final analysis commonsense will prevail and obstacles which today still hamper these ties from developing will be eliminated."

Shershnev had authored a substantial article on U.S.-Soviet trade in the 27 September issue of RURAL LIFE. In it he favorably reviewed recent U.S.-Soviet trade agreements and discussed Soviet imports of such items as U.S. equipment and consumer goods. Although he stressed the advantages for both countries of "longterm agreements on stable exchanges of some types of agricultural products," he nowhere mentioned Soviet imports of grain, nor did he give any indication that a longterm agreement on this subject was being contemplated at the time.

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PEKING SEES MOSCOW WEAKNESS, GUILF BEHIND U.S. GRAIN DEAL

Peking has broken its silence on the U.S.-Soviet five-year grain pact and oil purchase agreement with a spate of comment predictably gloating over Moscow's agricultural shortcomings and the implications for Brezhnev's position, but warning that the Soviets may exploit such deals to their own strategic advantage. China's reaction came in signed articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 31 October and 2 November and an NCNA commentary on the 31st. Peking radio broadcast the comment widely to foreign, including Russian, audiences.

Prominent PEOPLE'S DAILY commentator Jen Ku-ping asserted on 2 November that the Soviet agreement to purchase U.S. grain had underlined the "bankruptcy" of the agricultural policy of the "Khrushchev-Brezhnev clique," claiming that Moscow's agricultural failures stem from the Soviet "restoration of capitalism" and Moscow's allegedly distorted economic development policies that give first priority to "wild armaments expansion and war preparations." Jen played up Moscow's official silence on the U.S. deal as an indication of the Brezhnev regime's wariness about the internal implications of admitting agricultural failures.

In the same vein, NCNA on the 31st devoted the bulk of its anti-Soviet diatribe to mocking the Soviet need to purchase grain as evidence of Brezhnev's "important personal contribution" to Soviet agriculture. It noted that in this case Brezhnev has "kept mum," despite his usual practice of "lauding to the skies" even minor U.S.-Soviet agreements, because the Soviet leader was aware that Khrushchev's downfall had been prompted by his own agricultural "mess."

Jen Ku-ping depicted the United States as using the grain deal as "a means of influencing the Soviet revisionists, thereby keeping the momentum of the latter's rivalry with it within bounds." But he and the PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the 31st intimated that Moscow might turn the deal to its own economic and strategic advantage. Thus, Jen Ku-ping observed that Moscow was using its current crop failure as "a convenient smokescreen" for building up a "strategic reserve of grain" that would put Moscow in a better position in any future conflict with the West.

PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 31st warned that while the USSR has shown its economic weakness and dependence on Western grain and loans, "the Soviet revisionists are also cunning and crafty." Specifically recalling the 1972 "great grain robbery," when it said the USSR "fattened" itself on U.S. grain purchased with "American government subsidies," the article declared that the current Soviet purchases and search for Western credits had ulterior motives. It accused

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Moscow of using Western economic loans to woo countries such as Turkey away from the NATO orbit with the lure of Soviet economic assistance. It also claimed that Moscow was employing grain purchases to stave off Soviet domestic hunger while continuing rapid militarization of the Soviet economy, thereby enhancing Moscow's "military threat" to the West.

BACKGROUND NCNA reports on Soviet purchases of U.S. grain earlier this year included 18 September and 9 October dispatches on the course of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Moscow for a long-term grain contract. The reports had been confined largely to criticism of the Soviet agricultural "failure" and denunciations of Moscow's alleged efforts to gain economic profit at the West's expense. NCNA had depicted the Ford Administration as using the Soviet agricultural difficulties "to press" the USSR to agree to a long-term contract so as to sell off surplus U.S. grain while avoiding the "serious disruptions" and a "politically disastrous rise in domestic food prices" caused by past Soviet purchases.

USSR - VIETNAM

LE DUAN VISIT TO MOSCOW SUGGESTS STRENGTHENED RELATIONS

An improvement in Soviet-Vietnam relations in both tone and substance is suggested in the publicity surrounding the 27-31 October visit to the USSR by Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan. The visit was marked by unusually warm Soviet praise for the Vietnamese, and was capped by a joint declaration which broke new ground in putting Hanoi on record as supporting Moscow's policies of detente.

The warming trend in Soviet-DRV relations raises the question of whether Hanoi will be able to continue its balancing act between its two giant communist allies. Some doubt as to the state of PRC-DRV relations was raised during Le Duan's visit to Peking at the end of September. Chinese comment was notably restrained, and the visit ended summarily without the usual reciprocal Vietnamese banquet and a joint communique. On the other hand, it is possible that Le Duan will stop over in Peking en route home. The first secretary is currently vacationing in the Soviet Union and will go from there to Poland, continuing a tour of East European countries that began in early October.*

SOVIET-VIETNAMESE
RELATIONS

The protocol of the Le Duan visit to Moscow closely paralleled that during his previous visit in July 1973, with General Secretary Brezhnev acting as host and the top echelon of CPSU leaders joining in talks and turning out for Le Duan's arrival and for a luncheon on 28 October and a Kremlin reception on the 30th. However, the warm tone of the current Soviet reception for the VWP first secretary surpassed that reflected in 1973, at a time when Soviet-Vietnamese relations were still exacerbated by the impact on Soviet detente policies of the continuing hostilities in Vietnam after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement.

Brezhnev set the tone for Le Duan's current visit in his 28 October banquet speech, praising the "prestige" and "consistent internationalist policy" of the VWP and lauding Le Duan personally as an "outstanding figure in the world communist movement." In the past, Moscow as well as Hanoi have reserved such praise only for the late Ho Chi Minh.

The final joint declaration, signed by Brezhnev and Le Duan on 30 October, most clearly illustrates the improvement of Soviet-DRV

* Le Duan's 3-27 October East European visits are discussed in the TRENDS of 30 October 1975, pages S1-S3, and his 22-28 September visit to China is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 13-15, and 24 September 1975, pages 12-14.

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relations since 1973. The current Brezhnev-Le Duan talks were said to have taken place in a "warm atmosphere of fraternal solidarity, mutual understanding, and mutual respect"--a more positive description than in 1973, when talks were said to have passed in "an atmosphere of cordiality and comradely mutual understanding." More important, this time the two sides were said to hold "completely identical views on the matters brought to discussion"--a claim not made in 1973.

The key substantive difference between the two declarations was Vietnam's current willingness to endorse explicitly the Soviet policy of detente. Both the 1973 and 1975 declarations contained Vietnamese approval for Soviet policies of strengthening peace and security, peaceful coexistence, and support for the popular struggles for independence and social progress; however, the current document goes on to affirm the final goal of making "the course of detente irreversible." Lingered Vietnamese misgivings about detente seemed reflected in a 1 November NHAN DAN editorial on the visit, however, which omitted the allusion to detente from an otherwise complete citation of the Vietnamese declaration of support for Soviet foreign policy.

In line with the more forthcoming Vietnamese endorsement of Soviet diplomacy, the Vietnamese section of the declaration also went further than the 1973 document in paying tribute to Moscow's international position. Thus, the Vietnamese side asserted that the Soviet Union is "playing a specially important role" in the common struggle of nations for peace, independence, democracy, and socialism. By contrast, in 1973 the statement had merely acknowledged Soviet activities "with other fraternal socialist countries."

The Soviet side was similarly more forthcoming this time in appraising the stature of the VWP. While the 1973 statement had merely noted that the Vietnamese struggle was led by the party, the 1975 declaration lauds the "glorious" VWP for its "skillful" leadership. The current document also contains a gratuitous reference to the VWP as a "Marxist-Leninist party" and maintains that: "The prestige of the VWP--architect of all the victories of the Vietnamese people--has increased markedly."

In this same vein, the brief 1973 statement of satisfaction with the "continuous fruitful development of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and fraternal cooperation" was expanded considerably in the current declaration and underlined with references to the "unshakable" character of the ties. Amplifying the suggestion in the 1973 statement that the parties expand their ties and consultations, the current declaration specifically provides for broadening the exchange of experience by "arranging for contacts between leaders of the two countries, for mutual visits by missions of party cadres, and by

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promoting contacts between party organs."* It further states that the two sides would "encourage visits of official delegations and statesmen and appoint special envoys to regular meetings to exchange views on matters related to relations between the two sides as well as on international problems of mutual concern." Also, the declaration commits Vietnam to economic, scientific, and technical cooperation in the "framework of multilateral cooperation of the socialist countries"--a formulation not previously agreed to by Hanoi which could presage some Vietnamese association with CEMA.

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS The economic assistance package concluded by the Vietnamese in Moscow, also signed on the 30th and described in the joint declaration, included an agreement on Soviet assistance, including long-term loans, to Vietnam during 1976-1980, and a protocol on the coordination of the Soviet and Vietnamese five-year plans. Specifically, the agreement provided for assistance in examining the technical and economic aspects of the construction of an unspecified number of "major national economic projects," and loans on a "most-favored-nation" basis to enable Vietnam to promote industrialization, agriculture production, and welfare over the next five years. Soviet and Vietnamese media also reported that an agreement on "goods exchange and payments" for 1976-1980 and a protocol on trade and payments for next year was signed on 31 October.

Reports on Soviet-DRV economic agreements for 1974 and 1975 had not similarly specified that Soviet assistance to Vietnam would take the form of loans. During Le Duan's July 1973 visit to Moscow, Brezhnev had announced that the Soviet Union had decided to waive repayment for all assistance given during the previous war years.

* An accompanying communique on the visit revealed that the two sides had confirmed an agreement--also mentioned in 1973--on an official friendship visit to the DRV by a Soviet party-government delegation.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW EVINCES CONCERN OVER CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON

Soviet media have given civil strife in Lebanon over the past two months regular reportage and comment, most of which has emphasized concern for the heavy toll in lives and property and urged a peaceful solution to the factional fighting. Moscow's treatment of the recent crisis has laid the blame on "Lebanese reaction" while backing "progressive" forces, just as was done with previous outbreaks of fighting earlier this year. In recent weeks Soviet commentators have begun to express support for domestic reforms to solve the crisis, especially reform of Lebanon's political system, which has involved power-sharing arrangements between the Christian and Moslem communities based on a 40-year-old and now inaccurate census favoring the Christians.

Moscow's recent comment has been consistent with Soviet reaction to previous outbreaks of fighting last April, May, and June-July.* Thus, Moscow has denounced "Lebanese reaction" and the predominantly Christian "rightist forces" led by Pierre Jumayyil's Kata'ib (Phalangist) Party for allegedly fomenting and sustaining the conflict. Predictably, Soviet comment has supported the "progressive and national patriotic forces"--chiefly Moslems in Kamal Junblatt's leftist Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Ba'th Party, with the support of Palestinian fedayeen groups. In persistently urging a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Moscow has commended efforts by Prime Minister Karami, "the national dialog committee," Syrian and Palestinian mediators, and others to negotiate an end to the fighting.

Soviet comment raising the issue of external interference in Lebanon's problems predictably has condemned Israel for allegedly seeking to heighten and exploit the crisis, while avoiding direct charges of U.S. or Arab state involvement. A major PRAVDA commentary on 3 October warned directly that events in Lebanon had provided "no grounds for interference in Lebanese affairs by other states, particularly Israel." While making no direct claim of U.S.

* For discussion of Moscow's reaction to previous major civil strife in Lebanon in May 1973, involving units of the Lebanese army and the Palestinian fedayeen, see the TRENDS of 9 May 1973, page 16, and 16 May, page 20. At that time, Moscow essentially maintained an even-handed approach toward both sides and urged a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

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involvement on its own authority, Moscow has insinuated U.S. interference by replaying occasional Arab accusations and by suggesting U.S. support for Israeli plans to capitalize on the conflict by attacking Palestinian fedayeen positions.

CAUSES OF CONFLICT Soviet analyses of the underlying causes of Lebanon's crisis have stressed three major points, recently exemplified by PRAVDA's editor for Asian and African countries, Pavel Demchenko, in a 3 October PRAVDA article and again on Moscow radio's 2 November roundtable program. Demchenko listed the preconditions for a major conflict as (1) the development of acute social and economic divisions--"a gulf formed between a handful of parasitic rich and hundreds of thousands of deprived paupers"; (2) the maintenance of a special political system involving precise power-sharing arrangements between Christians and Moslems--"the ratio has not changed since 1943 [when the arrangements were established in the unwritten "national pact" as Lebanon prepared for national independence], although the balance between the religious communities has, of course, changed since then" in favor of the Moslems; and (3) the influence of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees, constantly in conflict with Israel in southern Lebanon as well as with Lebanese "haute bourgeoisie and rightist parties" who allegedly want to expel the Palestinian groups from Lebanon.

A similar explanation was provided by IZVESTIYA's foreign affairs editor, Albert Grigoryants, on the 12 October roundtable. Relying heavily on an analysis by LE MONDE's Mideast specialist, Eric Rouleau, Grigoryants emphasized an increase in recent years in Lebanon's "social polarization" which has been "aggravated by religious and ethnic stratifications." He developed the point that the Christians were formerly in the majority and therefore "the ruling Christian elite holds key state posts and wields great economic power," whereas Moslems now make up "some 65 percent" of the population.

CRITICISM OF RIGHTISTS, ISRAEL Soviet comment on recent fighting has zeroed in consistently on Lebanese "rightist forces" and condemned them for provoking the conflict, resisting efforts by Prime Minister Karami and others to end the fighting, and failing to honor cease-fires. The comment has also accused Israel of seeking to aggravate and exploit the crisis by conspiring with the Phalangists against the Palestinians. As in past comment, the most common Soviet charge has been that Israel wants to destroy the Palestinian fedayeen groups and has exploited the development of Lebanon's civil strife to intensify its air and sea raids against Palestinian targets in Lebanon. In September, PRAVDA on the 14th, IZVESTIYA on the 17th, and RED STAR on the 27th, all asserted that Israel's military actions against Palestinian targets

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had regularly increased in proportion to the fluctuating domestic conflict in Lebanon between the Phalangists and progressives.

Additionally, some Soviet comment has charged that a conspiracy has existed between Israel and the Phalangists against the Palestinians. A lengthy article by L. Medvedko in the 3 October issue of NEW TIMES, for example, alleged that a "pincers operation" was being waged by Israeli and Phalangist forces. Similarly, the deputy director of Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Ye. Primakov, alleged on Moscow radio's 24 October "international situation" program that the Phalangists and Israel had arranged "two plans," one to provoke civil war and Lebanese army intervention against the Palestinians, the other to wage a "so-called pincers operation" to trap the Palestinian fedayeen between invading Israeli forces and the Phalangists. An "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on 3 November repeated Primakov's remarks, accusing Israel additionally of beginning to prepare to intervene with military units in southern Lebanon.*

U.S. ROLE Typical of the effort by Soviet media to exploit Arab and Palestinian accusations of U.S. involvement in the Lebanese crisis was a TASS 30 October report citing a message to Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi from PLO head Yasir 'Arafat which charged that "there is no doubt that the United States is behind the events in Lebanon" and that the crisis fits U.S. Mideast policy goals "to split the Arab revolutionary movement, to support reactionary forces, and to strengthen its influence in the region." Additionally, Moscow has made thinly-veiled hints of U.S. involvement through such expressions as "Israel and those who support her" and "Zionism and imperialism." More recently, however, a K. Geyvandov PRAVDA dispatch on 3 November cited the Israeli newspaper DAVAR as having lamented that "the Western countries which formerly supported the Christian community in Lebanon have now abandoned it" and as being displeased that the United States considered events in Lebanon to be "an internal affair."

MOSCOW SUPPORT FOR PROGRESSIVES, PLO In accord with previous Soviet comment this year on Lebanon, Moscow has consistently referred favorably to Lebanese "progressive forces," often citing their positions on issues and stressing that they have worked for a negotiated end to the fighting. In the same

* Charges that Israel was preparing to implement contingency plans to invade and occupy southern Lebanon "up to the Litani river" have appeared occasionally in Soviet comment during the past year. A 9 January IZVESTIYA article by L. Koryavin, for example, asserted that "there is now a grave danger Israel may at any moment occupy a considerable part" of southern Lebanon and alleged there was a "long-standing" Israeli contingency plan for such an invasion.

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vein, Moscow has praised major Palestinian groups in Lebanon for their political maturity in refusing to be drawn into major fighting and for seeking to remain outside the conflict altogether. Ye. Primakov, for example, in remarks on Moscow radio's 24 October "international situation" program, stressed that Israeli and Phalangist schemes against the Palestinians had not succeeded largely due to "the sober attitude of the Palestinians, who refuse to interfere in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and even attempt to reconcile" the two sides and "bring about peace." Soviet comment has also praised the "positive" and "responsible" role of the PLO in cooperating with Prime Minister Karami in trying to restore order and arrange cease-fires. PLO head Yasir 'Arafat has been occasionally singled out and praised for his efforts to mediate between the fighting factions.

SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS Throughout the crisis Moscow has consistently urged a negotiated solution to the conflict, favorably reporting Prime Minister Karami's efforts to arrange cease-fires, and expressing cautious optimism about a return to domestic security and peace during each of the numerous short-lived cease-fires. As to the specifics of reforms that might lead to a solution, however, Moscow has largely limited itself to generalities that fall within the programs urged by Lebanese progressives--evidently reflecting awareness that the predominantly Christian "rightists" want little or no change, and the predominantly Moslem "progressives" seek substantial reforms. Most Soviet comment favoring reforms has expressed its support by citing Lebanese sources, as in a 4 November TASS dispatch from Beirut by A. Urasov, which said that Beirut newspapers were urging an end to the conflict and "a political settlement on the basis of political, economic, and social reforms." Similarly, an earlier reference to the issue of reforms was a 23 September PRAVDA dispatch by K. Geyvandov which cited Beirut's AS-SAFIR as saying that "wide-ranging democratic reforms of a political and socio-economic character" would provide a solution to the conflict, noting that such reforms were being proposed by Lebanese progressives.

Much Soviet comment has implied the need for reforms in discussion of the Christian-Moslem population ratio. By noting that the ratio has changed over the years in favor of the Moslems, the comment has implied that the 1943 "national pact" should be revised. Soviet commentators have not always been consistent with each other in discussing the present ratio--estimates have ranged from "roughly equal" to "a slight Moslem majority" to "65 percent are now Moslems."

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Moscow has infrequently advocated the need for Lebanese domestic reforms in original comment. Thus, a 25 October SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by V. Nikolayev, entitled "Lebanon's Difficult Days," concluded that "the time has come to think seriously about the problems facing the country and to try to approach from constructive positions the resolution, above all, of tasks of socio-political reorganization."

While expressing support for domestic reforms, Moscow has opposed rumored plans for the partition of Lebanon along religious community or other lines. Much of the opposition, as typified in remarks by P. Demchenko on the 2 November roundtable program, has been expressed as support for the Lebanese progressives' call for "preservation of the country as a united state." Additionally, some comment, as in a 25 October IZVESTIYA article by L. Koryavin, has attributed the notion of partition to "certain circles which are kindling the internal contradictions in Lebanon" and to "enemies of the Arab nation" who desire "to weaken resistance to imperialist intrigues."

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SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS

MOSCOW DEFENSIVE IN COMMENT ON GISCARD VISIT

While Soviet comment has routinely stressed the importance and success of French President Giscard d'Estaing's 14-18 October visit to the Soviet Union, it has nonetheless provided evidence to support Western press speculation that Soviet behavior during the visit was cool. Not only has there been no party-government statement endorsing the results of the visit--a feature of all previous French-Soviet summits--but a major PRAVDA editorial article on 26 October has assessed the visit in lukewarm terms while going out of its way to stress the Soviet Union's unfailing commitment to Marxism-Leninism, at best an inappropriate reassurance given the nature of the occasion. Moreover, the editorial article format--the most authoritative form of editorial statement--suggests that Moscow regards the issue as unusually sensitive, since all previous French-Soviet summits have rated straight editorials only.

IDEOLOGY AND DETENTE In its defense of ideology, PRAVDA asserted that the Soviet Union, despite its pursuit of peaceful coexistence with France and the other capitalist countries, "invariably and inviolably maintains positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian solidarity with the workers and liberation movements of the peoples." A similar statement was made by Brezhnev at the 14 October dinner speech welcoming Giscard. The French President had suggested a few minutes earlier that detente should be extended to the field of ideological rivalry, but Brezhnev replied that "relaxation of international tension by no means eliminates the struggle of ideas."

Moscow also seemed to go out of its way to curry favor with the French communists by reporting in PRAVDA during the French President's visit a French Communist Party communique which was critical of Giscard's domestic and foreign policies. The communique also criticized the Giscard government for allegedly trying to get Moscow to put pressure on the PCF to modify its policy.

In the same vein, the PRAVDA editorial article quoted L'HUMANITE as criticizing the French Government for giving only verbal support to Soviet proposals on prohibiting the development of new types of nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. L'HUMANITE had rebuked the French Government for not making any positive moves in this direction "without further delay." PRAVDA appeared to be expressing Moscow's concern and annoyance over reports that France might station some of its tactical Pluton nuclear missiles in West Germany.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS Soviet irritation with Giscard over what the Kremlin sees as France's declining independence and indications of renewed interest in NATO also surfaced during the visit. In his 14 October speech Brezhnev reminded Giscard that "the strength of France's policy lies in its independence" and "an independent France" can make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace. Referring to the two countries' mutually expressed interest in the "materialization of detente," the editorial article cautioned that it could not be forgotten that NATO is continuing to accumulate weapons "despite and in defiance of detente."

Insufficient progress in trade and economic cooperation between the two countries was alluded to on a number of occasions by the Soviet media and PRAVDA conveyed Moscow's disappointment with France in this regard. It said that even though trade and economic relations are developing "favorably on the whole" there is still "much unused potential" in this sphere.

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PRC - INDIA

PEKING RESTRAINED IN DENYING CHINESE CROSSED INDIAN BORDER

A 3 November PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement used relatively restrained language in denying charges made in a 1 November statement by the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman, who claimed that Chinese troops had violated Indian territory in a 20 October clash which killed four Indian soldiers. The Chinese statement avoided the harsh invective against the Indian government and its China policy that have characterized Chinese statements on the border since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. China did not comment on the border incident until after the Indian statement made it public.

According to the Chinese statement, Indian soldiers crossed into Chinese territory on 20 October despite repeated warnings from "Chinese civilian checkpoint personnel" and opened fire on the Chinese side, causing the latter to "fire back in self-defense." The statement said that the incident took place at the Tulung Pass (located on the eastern Sino-Indian border near Bhutan), as the Indian troops crossed "the line of actual control of November 7, 1959"--a phrase used by Peking in the past to refer to the so-called McMahon line which delineates the eastern part of the Sino-Indian frontier.

Peking's statement noted that a Chinese protest on the incident had been delivered to the Indian Embassy in Peking on 22 October, that the Indian Embassy had agreed on the 25th to accept China's offer of the 22d to collect the bodies of the four dead soldiers, and that an Indian representative at Tulung had accepted the bodies and captured Indian weapons and ammunition from the Chinese side on the 28th and had signed "a receipt."

BACKGROUND Though accusing the Indian side of spreading "slander" about the clash, the Chinese statement was far milder than China's last official protest over an armed border clash, in 1967. At that time a series of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements in September and October had scathingly labeled the Indians "aggressors," denounced the "reactionary Indian government" for its alleged hypocrisy in calling for a peaceful border settlement and normalization of relations with China, and accused New Delhi of working closely with the United States and the USSR to foster anti-China opinion in the world. In contrast to Peking's usual stress in the past on China's military preparedness in the face of further Indian "provocations," this current statement concluded by giving unusual emphasis to Peking's repeated measures to maintain the border status quo, avoid armed conflict, and "preserve peace" pending a final settlement of the frontier issue.

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MOSCOW TREATMENT

Since 1 November TASS has favorably replayed reports of the Indian protest. On 3 November TASS carried Indian press comment condemning the Chinese action as an affront to India's expressed desire for normal Sino-Chinese relations and as the latest evidence of "the great power, hegemonistic policy of the Chinese leaders" in South Asia. A 3 November Moscow radio commentary in English to South Asia--the first monitored Soviet comment on the border clash--similarly blasted the Chinese response as "another important link" in Peking's "chain of anti-Indian actions," which Moscow said included interference in the Kashmir and Sikkim issues and support for subversion and insurrection in northeastern India.

K O R E A

PYONGYANG OBSCURES UN VOTES ON CONFLICTING RESOLUTIONS

The North Korean media have obscured the fact that on 29 October the UN General Assembly's First Committee, in an unprecedented move, adopted two opposing draft resolutions on the Korean question, both of which will now be referred to the UN General Assembly. Pyongyang acknowledged only the passage of the pro-Pyongyang draft, by a 51-38 vote, which it described as an "overwhelming majority" and a "great victory" for the DPRK. Pyongyang has failed to acknowledge that the U.S.-sponsored draft also passed the First Committee, by a 59-51 vote, and that the General Assembly now must deal with the conflicting draft resolutions. By contrast, both Peking and Moscow media have acknowledged that the two resolutions will now be considered by the UNGA.

North Korean media have sought to make it appear that the Assembly actually had already adopted the pro-Pyongyang draft, and have called on the United States to implement that resolution--which calls for dissolution of the UN Command, withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag, and conclusion of a peace treaty between the "real parties"* to the Korean armistice agreement.

DPRK GOVERNMENT
STATEMENT ISSUED

DPRK comment on the UN debate thus far suggests that Pyongyang considers the First Committee passage of the pro-DPRK draft an important propaganda victory no matter what the General Assembly might finally do. A 31 October DPRK Government statement hailing the vote called it a "telling blow" at the United States and a "turning point" in the history of the United Nations, representing a breakdown of the U.S. "hand-raising machine" which in the past had passed "illegal" resolutions on the Korean question. Asserting that this is the first time the United Nations had adopted a "fair resolution" on the Korean issue, the government statement argued that Washington was under an "obligation" to implement that Pyongyang-backed resolution because the basis for the U.S. troop presence in South Korea--UN sanction--has now been undercut. A 31 October NODONG SINMUN editorial on the First Committee's vote made a similar case.

* In a 17 August 1975 DPRK Foreign Ministry memorandum, Pyongyang specified that "real parties" means the DPRK and the United States. That memorandum is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 20-21

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OTHER COMMENT Pyongyang has claimed over the past year that, Washington's protests notwithstanding, U.S. troops are in South Korea under UN auspices and not, as the United States claims, under the terms of the 1953 U.S.-ROK defense treaty. Pyongyang contends that passage of the resolution calling for withdrawal of foreign troops under the UN flag has removed any alleged legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops in the South. The 31 October government statement made no reference to the U.S. claim linking U.S. troops in South Korea to the defense treaty, but the NODONG SINMUN editorial stated, in standard Pyongyang terms, that the United States could not justify its troops' presence with "such rubbish" as the defense treaty, which had been "cooked up illegally."

Glossing over the passage of the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution, the government statement claimed that the success of the Pyongyang-backed draft had rendered the U.S. proposal "meaningless and useless." The NODONG SINMUN editorial went even further, claiming not only that the current U.S. draft has been "buried" as a "piece of scrap paper," but also that all the United Nations' past "illegal" resolutions justifying the U.S. troop presence in South Korea are now "null and void."

The only known North Korean acknowledgement--carried by the Peking media--that the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution on Korea had also been passed by the First Committee, in a UN speech on the 29th by DPRK delegate Yi Chong-mok which called that adoption "unjustifiable" and claimed that the Korean delegation would never recognize it, was excised from the 1 November Pyongyang KCNA version of Yi's speech. This passage was, however, reported by Peking's NCNA in a 30 October dispatch.

Neither the government statement nor the available KCNA summary of the NODONG SINMUN editorial included detailed objections to the U.S. resolution that Pyongyang had previously set forth in an 11 August government statement and 17 August foreign ministry memorandum.* The summarized editorial noted only that the U.S. draft would create "obstacles" to settlement of the Korean question, declaring that because the pro-Pyongyang draft had been passed, the United States "must accept the unanimous demand of the majority of the world's countries" and implement the DPRK resolution.

* The 11 August government statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 August 1975, pages 1-2.

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PEKING HANDLING
OF UN RESOLUTIONS

As last year, Peking issued an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator's article on 2 November following the First Committee's vote. Commentator endorsed the 31 October DPRK Government statement and claimed that implementation of the pro-Pyongyang draft would improve the situation on the Korean peninsula. However, Commentator did not suggest that the United States was now actually obligated to implement the resolution. Less harsh in its portrayal of the U.S. presence in Korea than a 21 October speech by PRC UN delegate Huang Hua, the Commentator article did not renew charges that the U.S. presence was a threat to the North's security or that U.S. troops had carried out "armed provocations" against the DPRK. It did charge that the "long stay" of U.S. "aggressor troops" in the South was the basic cause of tension in Korea, and that the UN Command is a "U.S. tool of aggression."

Arguing against the U.S. draft resolution, Commentator called the U.S. proposal for "alternative arrangements" to the UN Command an "obstacle" and said that the U.S. draft would "deepen the division" and "sharpen tension" in Korea. Commentator did not repeat the claim--included in Huang Hua's 21 October speech and PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's 26 September address to the General Assembly--that the U.S. draft was "absolutely unacceptable."

A 31 October NCNA report on the UN Korean debate claimed that before it took place, the United States amended its draft resolution "for fear that its cloven hoof would be revealed" and that it "played tricks" in order to have its draft adopted. Describing the debate as "hotter" than at the previous two General Assembly sessions, NCNA noted that the U.S. draft was adopted after "pains-taking efforts." NCNA also added to Peking's polemics against the Soviet Union's stand on the Korean question, charging that the Soviet UN representative had attempted to justify and provide "cover" for U.S. "aggression" against Korea. NCNA reiterated its recent charges that Moscow's altered rendering of the DPRK slogan for "independent and peaceful" reunification as "peaceful and democratic" reunification showed Moscow's perfidy. It claimed that the Seoul government also backs "democratic" but not "independent" reunification, and that, thus the Soviet representative saw "eye-to-eye" with the "puppet clique."

MOSCOW TREATMENT
OF KOREAN ISSUE

Moscow has noted the results of the UN voting in several TASS reports and commented authoritatively on it in a 5 November PRAVDA article devoted to the October Revolution anniversary, so far available only in an abbreviated TASS version. A Moscow radio broadcast to Korea on the 4th claimed that as a result of the vote in the First Committee the United States had "lost its token right

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to station troops in South Korea under the guise of the UN flag." The commentary also contained Moscow's first direct response to recent Peking attacks on the Soviet stand on Korea, charging that the PRC UN representative had attempted to "obscure" the Soviet position, and that such an attempt by Peking "only serves the purpose of dividing the ranks of people who expect to see the peaceful unification of Korea."

Moscow's last substantial media comment on the UN Korean debate was a 24 October IZVESTIYA commentary. IZVESTIYA noted that withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and cessation of military confrontation on the peninsula would accord with the interests of the peoples of "both Korean states." The commentary went on to cite Soviet UN delegate Malik's remarks that adoption of the pro-DPRK, Soviet-cosponsored resolution by the General Assembly would promote "normalization" of the situation in Korea and create favorable conditions for reunification, but offered no other support for the resolution. IZVESTIYA offered support for the DPRK's "big, constructive program," which it described as a proposal for a confederation of the "two states," and the setting up of the North-South Coordination Committee that has "embarked on a dialog in which points of contacts are being sought." This upbeat assessment of the North-South dialog contrasts with Pyongyang's current line, which is that the dialog is on the "brink of rupture" due to the Pak regime's "sabotage." IZVESTIYA did not mention the U.S. draft resolution on Korea.

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CAMBODIA - THAILAND

IENG SARY BANGKOK VISIT RESTORES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The 28 October-1 November visit to Thailand by Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary has been capped by the announcement that diplomatic relations have been restored. The announcement came in the 31 October communique on the visit--the first to a noncommunist Southeast Asian country by a leader of the new Cambodian regime. Cambodian pronouncements during the visit avoided contentious issues in Thai-Cambodian relations, unlike Vietnam and Laos, which have continued harsh criticism of Bangkok politics.*

The joint communique cited "traditional links and similarities" between the Thai and Cambodian peoples, the two nations' "deep sense of neighborliness" arising from their geographical proximity, and the "common aspirations" of the two nations to maintain peaceful relations as the basis for normalizing relations. However, the communique did not state when relations would be fully normalized, noting that an exchange of ambassadors would occur only "at a date convenient to both countries depending on the conditions prevailing." It included pledges to respect each other's territorial integrity, to resolve issues between them without resort to force, and to prohibit "the use of its territory by any third country in any form." The communique also noted that "the political, economic and social system" of each country is "solely the affair of the people of that country" and that "external interference will not be tolerated."

The communique stated that the two sides discussed economic and trade cooperation, but added that "the terms and the modality of trade" between the two countries would be discussed at a later date. Bangkok radio broadcasts on 1 November reported that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai had stated that temporary liaison offices would be established by each side--the Thai office in Aranyaprathet, and the Cambodian office in Poipet--to handle immigration and trade affairs until permanent embassies are opened in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, and that rail links between Aranyaprathet and Poipet will be reopened.

OTHER COMMUNIST
REACTION

Peking's NCNA on 2 November promptly reported principal clauses of the joint communique on Ieng Sary's visit. Hanoi reported the visit and the joint communique in brief reports on 30 October and 1 November, and a 2 November Saigon domestic radio broadcast briefly noted the

* For earlier discussion of Thailand-Vietnam issues that have obstructed efforts to restore diplomatic relations, see the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 19-21, and of 13 August 1975, pages 4-6.

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Thai-Cambodian normalization. The Pathet Lao radio reported Ieng Sary's visit on the 31st. A 1 November Moscow radio commentary on recent changes in Thai Government policies acknowledged in passing the normalization of relations with Phnom Penh. The PRC-based clandestine radio of the Thai Communist Party, the Voice of the People of Thailand, reviewed the accomplishments of Ieng Sary's visit in a straightforward broadcast on 3 November, praising Cambodian policies while muting the station's usual abusive characterizations in referring to prominent Thai government officials.

PORTUGAL

MOSCOW CITES RIGHTIST DANGERS, SEES GOVERNMENT IN COMMAND

Soviet coverage of Portuguese developments continues to stress the need for "unity of progressive forces" and vigilance against a possible move by reactionaries. Generally, the Soviet reaction to recurrent rumors of a planned "rightist coup" has been less strident and vocal than last summer--some observers portraying the Portuguese army as alert and last summer's "counterrevolutionary drive" as halted. However, some Moscow commentators, referring to the imminent 11 November date when Portugal is scheduled to grant independence to her last major colony, Angola, have suggested there are rightwing plans to thwart the revolutionary process in Portugal while at the same time preventing the transfer of power to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which maintains control of Luanda.

TASS correspondent Mikhail Artyushenkov on 1 November reported the arrest of two fugitive rightwing leaders in northern Portugal (TASS called the two "a group of counterrevolutionaries"), tying this event to rumors of a forthcoming coup. Artyushenkov noted that "counterrevolutionaries are trying to coordinate their actions in Portugal and Angola," and, in keeping with Moscow's tendency to equate actions against the MPLA as threats against the whole of Angola, he scored former members of Salazar's secret police who were said to have arrived secretly in Luanda "to organize subversive activities against the MPLA." Drawing on Portuguese sources with similar views, TASS on 29 October implied that all Portuguese progressives favored the MPLA and reported that Admiral Rosa Coutinho had "demanded" that "all power in Angola be handed over to the MPLA" on 11 November. PRAVDA on the 27th also quoted PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal's reference to the MPLA as "the genuine, legitimate representative of the Angolan people" and cited the PCP's charge that "imperialist forces" were attempting to prevent Portugal's transfer of power to the MPLA.

While such Soviet coverage reflects concern about the plans of "rightist forces" in Lisbon and Luanda, Moscow's reaction is generally low-key and, occasionally, optimistic. Thus, a long article by PRAVDA's Lisbon correspondent B. Kotov on 25 October stressed PCP confidence that "revolutionary forces are taking the initiative" and indicated that last summer's "real danger of an abrupt shift to the right" was now on the wane. Another Kotov dispatch, published in PRAVDA the following day, reported that the Portuguese army was in a state of readiness because of reports of "planned sabotage

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by extreme rightwing groups," and that, as a result of such measures, "the situation in the country today is absolutely calm." Moscow's handling of the coup rumors accords with the usually cautious treatment given the government of Prime Minister Azevedo, whom Moscow does not criticize directly and, on infrequent occasions, portrays favorably. A 23 October KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA dispatch by correspondents Khuzemi and Artyushenkov, for example, noted that Azevedo's government had "adopted a number of important measures" and that "the attacks of counterrevolution have been halted."

CEAUSESCU ENDORSES MODERATE TACTICS BY "DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES

During a 28-31 October visit to Portugal, Romanian leader Ceausescu cautioned local political forces that failure to subordinate their differences endangers Portugal's national independence. Although Ceausescu's criticism of traditional Western political concepts accords with standard Soviet doctrine, his stress on the importance of unity and independence seems to have reference to Romania as well as Portugal.

Ceausescu's allusions to foreign interference in Portugal's domestic affairs appeared to be directed primarily toward dangers from the right, as in a 29 October toast to Premier Azevedo when he asserted that "everything that is undertaken must prevent a return to the past." Similarly, in stressing the need for political unity, he twice raised the specter of Portugal repeating the Chilean experience. Ceausescu combined his expressed fears of the right with unusually frank criticism of Western concepts of government. Thus, in his toast to Azevedo he disparaged Western-style democracy for allegedly promoting economic inequalities and rejected political pluralism as "not essential" because "you can have a single party and a very good democracy."

Ceausescu allowed, however, that for the foreseeable future Portugal must be represented by a broad spectrum of "progressive and democratic forces." Thus, in his 29 October toast, he asserted that "there is no other way for Portugal but cooperation among Communists, Socialists and other political forces, in close connection with the army" in order to promote the unity of various forces including "that part of the bourgeoisie which wants to serve the fatherland." This is a position that might be disputed by militant communists, but it is one that is shared by the more moderate.

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His apparent effort to equate the dangers facing both Portugal and Romania was particularly evident during a press conference on the final day of his visit in which he asserted that it is both "natural and necessary" that Portugal develop its relations with the socialist countries, adding that it is also expected that Lisbon will continue to develop its relations with the developing and developed capitalist states. He went on to explain that Portugal's increased ties with the socialist bloc cannot be interpreted as "counter" or "harmful" to the other Western countries or the United States since the "development of any independent state" can only promote international peace and understanding. Thus, he pointedly referred to Romania's "very sound relations" with all western countries--including the United States--as well as all developing and socialist countries, a situation which he described as "not detrimental to anyone."

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U S S R

SUSLOV ASSOCIATE ATTACKS RUSSOPHILE IN KOMMUNIST ARTICLE

An article in the September issue of KOMMUNIST, No. 14, assailing well-known Russophile writer Oleg Mikhaylov for writing a 1974 book extolling pre-revolutionary traditions constitutes the most serious attack on the Russophile movement in recent years. Its author is the venerable ultraconservative ideologist V.P. Stepanov, who is a member of KOMMUNIST's editorial board and has been associated with Suslov.

The Russophile movement, which burgeoned during the 1960's, represents a strongly conservative trend which has disturbed orthodox communist conservatives by overstressing the traditional nationalistic Russian values at the expense of new communist internationalistic and proletarian values. The trend was censured by Agitprop in the late 1960's, but remains strong among conservative communists, making it difficult for ideologists like Stepanov and Suslov to move against it decisively. The last serious attack on Russophilism, made by a Suslov subordinate in late 1972, backfired and resulted in the dismissal of the critic. Since then, attacks have been relatively rare; hence such an attack in the leading party journal by a prominent conservative ideologist is all the more striking.

Mikhaylov's book, "Faithfulness," calls on the younger generation to be faithful to the "traditions of the classics," to patriotism and "the national pride of the Russian people," according to Stepanov. Pointing out that national traditions included not only progressive but also conservative and even reactionary components, Stepanov insisted that "when we speak of the Motherland, we always rightly stress our Soviet socialist Motherland." He censured Mikhaylov for lauding the humanism of Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy and Bunin. Stepanov conceded that Russians are rightly proud of these great writers but argued that their ideas cannot be accepted by communists.

The 70-year old Stepanov rose under Stalin and has long been a spokesman for hardline views. He appears to have had ties with Suslov for many years. He became chief editor of the Central Committee's cultural paper CULTURE AND LIFE in 1949, after ideological supervisor Zhdanov had died and young Central Committee Secretary Suslov had taken over supervision of ideology. He later was deputy head of Agitprop, deputy chief editor of PFAVDA, and from 1962-65 chief editor of KOMMUNIST. In the latter post, he created a stir with his 17 May 1965 PRAVDA article attacking

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Khrushchev's pragmatism and defending the importance of ideology. He apparently fell into disfavor in late 1965 and was demoted merely to membership of the board of KOMMUNIST and was not reelected a Central Committee candidate member in 1966. Although he has never been publicly identified as an assistant to Suslov, his tie to Suslov was revealed when he edited the collection of Suslov speeches published in 1972. All the collections of speeches of Brezhnev and Kosygin published in recent years have been edited by men publicly identified as their assistants.

The main high-level attack on Russophiles in recent years was a late 1972 LITERARY GAZETTE article by A.N. Yakovlev, a first deputy head of Agitprop and, thus, a subordinate of Suslov. According to rumors circulating in Moscow at the time, the article had been endorsed for publication by Suslov himself. Despite such high-level backing, there reportedly was a sharp behind-the-scenes reaction, resulting in Yakovlev's dismissal and appointment as ambassador to Canada in early 1973.

* * * * *

A D D E N D U M

The article on the October 1975 CPSU slogans carried in the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, page 23, failed to note that a traditional appeal for "further strengthening of our motherland's economic and defense might" was dropped from its usual place in a slogan addressed to the Soviet workers. These words had appeared in the same slogan in each of the semi-annual lists since October 1972. Prior to that, Soviet practice regarding the use of the formula has varied, and there have been several periods when the appeal was not used at all.

NOTES

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: A 29 October Canton report on a local meeting on learning from the model Tachai brigade in agriculture revealed that CCP Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching has been transferred from his post as party chief in Kwangsi to become first secretary of the Kwangtung provincial party committee and chairman of the revolutionary committee there. Wei headed a lengthy list of Kwangtung leaders at the meeting including Canton Military Region commander Hsu Shih-yu, and Wei delivered the major address at the rally, stressing the need for local party committees "to do a good job of all current work with autumn harvesting, winter cultivation and agricultural capital construction." Wei replaces Chao Tzu-yang, Kwangtung's party chief prior to the cultural revolution, who was reinstated in his old job in 1974. Chao last appeared in Peking on 19 October, when he and several other provincial leaders attended the closing session of the national conference on learning from Tachai. Chao had appeared regularly in Kwangtung during the past several months, and there is no evidence that he is under political attack. Wei's move to Kwangtung, which has created a vacancy in Kwangsi, may be part of a larger transfer plan designed to fight provincialism and strengthen central party control. The last transfer of a provincial party boss took place in December 1973, as part of Peking's massive rotation of all military region commanders who were also provincial party chiefs, a device used to strip military leaders of their civil posts and put more provincial party committees under the direct control of civilian leaders.

PEKING ON USSR-ANGOLA: A 5 November Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article has authoritatively lambasted recent Soviet messages on the Angolan issue. The messages have not been publicized by the Soviet media, but according to African reports they were addressed to Zaire officials and the head of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Commentator article attacked Moscow for allegedly planning to recognize Angolan independence under "a single liberation movement." Commentator called the messages "an ominous indication" of Moscow's "further intervention and aggression in Angola," a "wanton slander, threat, and intimidation" against Zaire, and a "threat" to the entire OAU. Commentator "strongly condemned" the USSR in the name of the Chinese people, and "resolutely backed" the OAU position, supported by Zaire, calling for unity among the three Angolan liberation groups. Peking's last authoritative comment on Angola, another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 19 September, had attacked Soviet interference in Angolan affairs but had not specifically condemned the Soviet Union in the name of the Chinese people. Peking has attacked Soviet "interference" in the OAU before--most recently in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the conclusion of the 12th OAU summit conference--but not in reference to Angola.

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Like previous authoritative comment, Commentator did not specify which Angolan group the Soviet Union supports exclusively, and it repeated Peking's standard line that the "Angolan problem" should be solved by Angolans themselves "through consultations" and under the guidance of the OAU. A Peking in Arabic broadcast at 1630 GMT on 2 November briefly reported that "the Chinese Government issued a statement" on 31 October calling for an end to the fighting among the three competing Angolan liberation groups, a halt to foreign interference, and the withdrawal of "mercenaries" fighting there. Inexplicably, this Chinese statement is not known to have been carried in other monitored Chinese media.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 OCTOBER - 2 NOVEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2620 items)</u>		<u>Peking (893 items)</u>	
DRV Party-Government	(--) 18%	FRG Chancellor Schmidt	(--) 15%*
Delegation in USSR		in PRC	
[Brezhnev Speech	(--) 4%]	UNGA 30th Session	(8%) 11%
Venus 9 and 10 Space	(8%) 8%	[Korea Debate	(6%) 9%]
Missions		25th Anniversary of	(8%) 3%
China	(7%) 6%	Chinese Volunteers'	
Algerian Revolution	(--) 4%	Entry in Korean War	
21st Anniversary		USSR	(2%) 3%
		PRC Nuclear Test	(--) 3%
		PRC National Coal	(--) 3%
		Conference	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Schmidt.